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1Cooperative Precoding and Artificial Noise Design
for Security over Interference Channels
Ayc¸a ¨Ozc¸elikkale and Tolga M. Duman
Abstract—We focus on linear precoding strategies as a physical
layer technique for providing security in Gaussian interference
channels. We consider an artificial noise aided scheme where
transmitters may broadcast noise in addition to data in order to
confuse eavesdroppers. We formulate the problem of minimizing
the total mean-square error at the legitimate receivers while
keeping the error values at the eavesdroppers above target levels.
This set-up leads to a non-convex problem formulation. Hence, we
propose a coordinate block descent technique based on a tight
semi-definite relaxation and design linear precoders as well as
spatial distribution of the artificial noise. Our results illustrate
that artificial noise can provide significant performance gains
especially when the secrecy levels required at the eavesdroppers
are demanding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure transmission in the presence of eavesdroppers is a
problem of central importance in wireless communications.
In recent years, physical layer techniques which typically
exploit the channel conditions to provide secrecy have become
increasing popular. Here, we focus on Gaussian interference
channels, which form a particularly important and relevant
setting in wireless media [1–4].
Various aspects of secure communications over interference
channels have been studied from a rate perspective [1–5].
Although rate as a performance metric provides important
insights into fundamental limits for secure communications, it
should be complemented with low-complexity approaches in
order to obtain practical secure systems. With this motivation,
quality-of-service (QoS) framework which adopts signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) or mean-square error based metrics as
performance criteria has recently been used to improve the
security performance of communication systems [6–13].
In this regard, we adopt a minimum mean-square error
(MMSE) based framework similar to [8–13]. Characterization
of optimal precoders are provided for a point-to-point (P2P)
setting for parallel degraded Gaussian channels in [8] and for
general degraded Gaussian channels in [9]. General case of
Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) P2P chan-
nels where the legitimate receiver uses a linear zero-forcing
(ZF) filter is considered in [10]. An artificial noise (AN) aided
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MMSE scheme without explicit performance constraints for
eavesdroppers is investigated in [11]. Design of artificial noise
that lies in the null space of legitimate receivers’ channels is
considered for multi-user settings in [12], [13].
We consider the Gaussian interference channel scenario,
and formulate the problem of minimizing the total weighted
MMSE at the legitimate receivers while keeping the MMSE at
the eavesdroppers above target levels. Transmitters also utilize
artificial noise transmission in addition to linear precoding. We
focus on the scenario with MIMO legitimate receiver channels
and multiple-input single-output (MISO) eavesdropper chan-
nels. This set-up, in general, leads to a non-convex problem
formulation. Utilizing a semi-definite relaxation, we propose
a block coordinate descent approach with a convergence
guarantee. Our results illustrate that adopting an artificial noise
aided scheme is particularly important when the secrecy levels
desired at the eavesdroppers are demanding.
The rest of the letter is organized as follows. The system
model is given in Section II. The linear precoder and arti-
ficial noise design problem is formulated in Section III. In
Section IV, the proposed approaches are presented. The per-
formance of the proposed solutions are illustrated in Section V.
We conclude the letter in Section VI.
Notation: Uppercase and lowercase letters denote matrices,
and column/row vectors respectively. The complex conjugate
transpose of a matrix A is denoted by A†. The ith row, jth
column element of a matrix A is denoted as [A]ij . Positive
semi-definite ordering is denoted by . An optimal value of
an optimization variable A is denoted by A∗.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Interference Channel
The multi-antenna transmitter i (Ti) sends information to
the multi-antenna legitimate receiver i (LRi), i = 1, 2. This
communication is eavesdropped through a MISO channel by
the eavesdropper receivers (ERs) whose aim is to reconstruct
the message of Ti’s. The signals received by LRi and ERi can
be represented as follows:
yLi = H
L
i1x1 +H
L
i2x2 +w
L
i , (1)
yEi = h
E
i1x1 + h
E
i2x2 + w
E
i , (2)
where HLik ∈ Cnr×nt and hEik ∈ C1×nt represent the channel
gains from the transmitter k to the LRi and to the ERi,
respectively i, k = 1, 2. All channel gains are fixed through-
out the transmission. Zero-mean complex proper Gaussian
wLi ∈ C
nr×1 ∼ CN (0,KwL
i
), KwL
i
= E[wLi wLi
†
] = σ2w,L,iI,
σ2w,L,i > 0 and wEi ∈ C1×1 ∼ CN (0, σ2w,E,i), denote the
noise at LRs’ and ERs’ channels, respectively.
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Fig. 1: Interference channel with eavesdroppers.
The channel inputs xi’s are formed as follows
xi = Aisi + vi, (3)
where the zero-mean complex proper Gaussian si ∈ Cn,
si ∼ CN (0, I), denotes the data and Ai ∈ Cnt×n denotes
the precoding matrix at the ith transmitter. The zero-mean
complex proper Gaussian vi ∈ Cnt , vi ∼ CN (0,Kvi)
with Kvi = E[viv
†
i ] denotes the artificial noise transmitter
i broadcasts with the aim of obtaining better secrecy levels
(higher error values) at the eavesdroppers. All signals, si,
vi, w
L
i and wEi , i = 1, 2, are assumed to be statistically
independent. Hence we have Kxi = E[xix
†
i ] = AiA
†
i +Kvi .
We adopt the following short-hand notations: A¯ =
(A1,A2), K¯v = (Kv1 ,Kv2). The conditions Kv1 
0, Kv2  0 are denoted by K¯v  0.
B. MMSE Estimation at the Legitimate Receivers
The designated legitimate receiver for transmitter i is de-
noted by LRi. Hence upon receiving yLi , LRi forms the
MMSE estimate of si as follows [14, Ch2]
E[si|yLi ] = KsiyLi K
−1
yL
i
yLi , (4)
where KsiyLi =E[siy
L
i
†
] = KsiA
†
iH
L
ii
†
and
KyL
i
=E[yLi y
L
i
†
]=HLiiKxiH
L
ii
†
+HLijKxjH
L
ij
†
+ σ2w,L,iI,
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Here K−1yi exists, since Kyi ≻ 0 with
σ2w,L,iI ≻ 0. The MMSE at LRi can be expressed as follows
εLRi(A¯, K¯v) = E[||si − E[si|yLi ]||
2]
= tr[Ksi −KsiyLi K
−1
yL
i
K
†
siy
L
i
]
(5)= n− tr[A†iHLii
†
K−1
yL
i
HLiiAi].
C. Secrecy Constraints at the Eavesdroppers
Eavesdroppers are interested in the data transmitted by
both transmitters. They employ MMSE estimation, hence the
estimate of si at ERk can be expressed as
E[si|yEk ] = KsiyEk K
−1
yE
k
yEk , (6)
where KyE
k
=σ2
yE
k
=E[yEk yEk
†
]. Under the Gaussian signalling
assumptions, MMSE estimation is the optimum strategy that
can be adopted by the ERs for the mean-square error perfor-
mance criterion. We also note that the mean-square error based
filters provide a reasonably accurate alternative to maximum
likelihood (ML) decoding for preprocessing of coded data
symbols [15]. Since it is difficult to provide a comprehensive
analysis of practical bit error performance in security scenar-
ios, here we adopt mean-square error estimation as a practical
measure. Similar SNR or MMSE based approaches have been
adopted for a number of security scenarios; see, for instance,
[6–13].
The mean-square error at ERk for estimating si can be
expressed as follows
εiERk(A¯, K¯v) = E[||si − E[si|y
E
k ]||
2]
= n−
hEkiAiA
†
ih
E
ki
†
hEkiKxih
E
ki
†
+ hEkjKxjh
E
kj
†
+ σ2w,E,i
,
where i, j, k = 1, 2, i 6= j.
We consider the following secrecy (security) requirements
that aim to keep the MMSE at the ERs above given levels
εiERk(A¯, K¯v) ≥ γki, i, k = 1, 2. (7)
We note that the region of interest for γki is γki ∈ [n− 1, n]
where [n − 1, n] is the range of admissible values for the
MMSE over a MISO channel. (The lower bound n−1 is found
by considering the case without the interference and the noise;
and the upper bound n = tr[Ksi ] is the total uncertainty in
the unknown signal si.) When γki > n, the secrecy constraints
cannot be satisfied. The secrecy constraints can be written
more explicitly as follows
(8)h
E
kiKvih
E
ki
†
+ hEkjKxjh
E
kj
†
+ σ2w,E,i
− γ¯ki(h
E
kiAiA
†
ih
E
ki
†
) ≥ 0,
where i 6= j, γ¯ki = (n− γki)−1 − 1, γ¯ki ∈ [0,∞), γki < n.
III. JOINT LINEAR PRECODER AND ARTIFICIAL NOISE
DESIGN
We consider the following collaborative transmission strate-
gies design problem which seeks the optimal linear precoders
and the artificial noise covariances in order to minimize the
sum of the weighted MMSE’s at the legitimate receivers while
satisfying the secrecy requirements at the eavesdroppers:
(P1) min
A¯
K¯v0
α1 εLR1(A¯, K¯v) + α2 εLR2(A¯, K¯v) (9a)
s.t. εiERk(A¯, K¯v) ≥ γki, i, k = 1, 2, (9b)
tr[AiAi
†] + tr[Kvi ] ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2, (9c)
where (9c) represents the power constraints at the transmitters.
The noise covariance matrices Kvi’s determine the spatial
distribution of the artificial noise. Hence this formulation
optimizes the spatial distribution of the noise together with
the linear precoders.
In this set-up, transmitters can exchange information about
channel state information and determine the optimal strategies
cooperatively, for instance, through the usage of a secure land
line [7], [16]. Such approaches are particularly relevant when
the eavesdroppers’ channel information is available at the
transmitter side, for instance, in broadcasting with confidential
messages [7], [16–18]. In such scenarios, the eavesdroppers
are registered users of the network but they are only allowed
to access to a particular set of content.
3Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Problem P1
Initialize:
Set ε0LRi = tr[Ksi ], i = 1, 2.
Set (BL1 ,BL2 )0 = (I, I).
Let t = 1.
repeat
Using (BL1 ,BL2 )t−1, solve (13) for (A¯, K¯v, Z¯)t.
if (11d) is not satisfied then
Generate (A¯, K¯v)t using [19, Algorithm RED].
end if
Using (A¯, K¯v)t, solve (4) for (BL1 ,BL2 )t.
Using (A¯, K¯v)t and (5) determine εtLR1 , εtLR2 .
until (α1εt−1LR1 + α2ε
t−1
LR2
− (α1ε
t
LR1
+ α2ε
t
LR2
) ≤ ǫ)
// The stopping criterion is met.
Output: (A¯, K¯v)t, εtLR1 , ε
t
LR2
.
We note that the formulation in Problem P1 is not convex.
The objective function is not a convex function of (A¯, K¯v).
Moreover, in general the security constraints are not convex.
In particular, left-hand side of (8) is the sum of a convex
quadratic function and a concave quadratic function in terms
of Ai’s. In general, lower bounding such a function does not
form a convex constraint. Although it is possible to write the
problem using new variables Ri = AiA†i  0 instead of
Ai’s so that security constraints are linear constraints, this new
formulation will have rank-constraints, i.e., rank(Ri) ≤ n,
which, in general, do not form convex constraints.
IV. TRANSMISSION STRATEGIES FOR LINEAR PRECODING
AND ARTIFICIAL NOISE BROADCAST
We first study the scenario where fixed receiver filters
are adopted at the legitimate receivers in Section IV-A. In
Section IV-B, we utilize this formulation to provide designs
for the general case.
A. Fixed Estimators at Legitimate Receivers
In this case, the estimation filters at the LRs are fixed while
the eavesdroppers employ the MMSE estimation.
Let BLi be the estimator adopted at the LRi. Hence the
mean-square error at LRi can be expressed as follows:
εFLRi(A¯, K¯v)
= E[||si −BLi y
L
i ||
2],
= tr[Ksi ]−tr[KsiyLi B
L
i
†
]−tr[BLi K
†
siy
L
i
]+tr[BLi KyLi B
L
i
†
],
= n− tr[A†iH
L
ii
†
BLi
†
]− tr[BLi H
L
iiAi]
+ tr[BLi Hii(AiAi
†+Kvi)Hii
†BLi
†
]
+tr[BLi Hij(AjAj
†+Kvj)Hij
†BLi
†
]+σ2w,L,i tr[B
L
i B
L
i
†
],
where i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Hence, for fixed BLi ’s, the problem of
finding the optimal (A¯, K¯v) in order to minimize the weighted
sum of the estimation errors at the LRs while satisfying the
secrecy constraints can be formulated as follows:
(P2) min
A¯,K¯v
α1 ε
F
LR1
(A¯, K¯v) + α2 ε
F
LR2
(A¯, K¯v) (10)
s.t. (9b), (9c).
In this formulation, the objective function is a convex
quadratic function in AiA†i and linear in Kvi . Hence it
is convex in (A¯, K¯v). Nevertheless, the eavesdropper error
constraints are, in general, still not convex in (A1,A2). Hence
we introduce Zi = AiA†i , i = 1, 2 with Z¯ = (Z1,Z2). The
part of the error that depends on the optimization variables
(A¯, K¯v, Z¯) can be expressed as follows
εZLRi(A¯, K¯v, Z¯) = tr[B
L
i H
L
ii(Zi +Kvi)H
L
ii
†
BLi
†
]
+ tr[BLi Hij
L(Zj +Kvj)Hij
L†BLi
†
]
− 2Re(tr[A†iH
L
ii
†
BLi
†
]),
where Re[z] denotes the real part of z ∈ C. The error at ERk
for estimating si can be written in terms Zj’s as follows
εi ZERk(K¯v, Z¯)
= n−
hEkiZih
E
ki
†
hEki(Zi +Kvi)h
E
ki
†
+ hEkj(Zj +Kvj )h
E
kj
†
+ σ2w,E,k
where i, j, k = 1, 2, i 6= j. Hence the problem in (10) can be
reformulated as follows:
min
A¯,K¯v,Z¯
α1 ε
Z
LR1
(A¯, K¯v, Z¯) + α2 ε
Z
LR2
(A¯, K¯v, Z¯) (11a)
s.t. εi ZERk(K¯v, Z¯) ≥ γik, i, k = 1, 2, (11b)
tr[Zi +Kvi ] ≤ Pi, i = 1, 2, (11c)
Zi = AiA
†
i , i = 1, 2. (11d)
We note that (11b) form convex constraints, since they can
be written as linear functions of (K¯v, Z¯) similar to (8). The
constraints in (11d) represent equality constraints involving
convex functions of Ai’s, hence they are not convex. We relax
the constraints in (11d) as follows:
Z1  A1A1
†, Z2  A2A2
†. (12)
Hence a relaxation of (11) is obtained, i.e.,
min
A¯,K¯v,Z¯
α1 ε
Z
LR1
(A¯, K¯v, Z¯) + α2 ε
Z
LR2
(A¯, K¯v, Z¯) (13)
s.t. (11b), (11c), (12).
We note that εZLRi(A¯, K¯v, Z¯) still depends on Ai. This
relaxation is tight as shown in Thm. 4.1:
Theorem 4.1: Let n ≥ 3. Let (13) be solvable. Then the
optimum error values for the relaxed problem in (13) and the
problem in (10) are equal and can be attained. Moreover, an
optimal solution for (10) can be constructed from an optimal
solution of (13).
The proof is given in Appendix A. Since (13) is convex,
optimal solutions can be found by efficient numerical tech-
niques using tools such as SeDuMi, SDPT3 and CVX [20–
22]. Although (10) is non-convex, Thm. 4.1 guarantees that it
can be efficiently solved using the convex problem in (13).
B. MMSE Estimators at All Receivers
We now consider Problem P1 where the MMSE estimators
are employed also at the legitimate receivers. We propose a
block coordinate descent method where we take turns in fixing
(A¯, K¯v) and fixing the estimators BLi , i = 1, 2. For fixed
(A¯, K¯v) the optimal BLi ’s are given by (4). By Theorem 4.1,
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Fig. 2: MMSE versus secrecy requirements, nt = 5.
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Fig. 3: MMSE versus secrecy requirements, nt = 3.
at fixed (BL
1
,BL
2
) step, Problem P2 can be optimally solved
using (13). An optimal rank constrained solution from the
solution of (13) is generated using the procedure given in
Appendix A. The proposed method is summarized in Al-
gorithm 1. Here the objective function of Problem P1 is
guaranteed to decrease under each iteration. Since the error is
bounded from below, Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to converge.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now illustrate the performance of our designs. The error
performance of the legitimate receivers is reported as follows:
ε¯=(α1ε1 + α2ε2)/ε0, where ε0=tr[Ks1 ]= tr[Ks2 ]=n. The
channel matrices for LRs and ERs are generated independently
with independent and identically distributed complex proper
zero-mean Gaussian elements with variance σ2H = 1. The
average results for 100 channel realizations are reported. We
set σ2w,L,i = σ
2
w,E,i = σ
2
w = 1, i = 1, 2; n = 3, nr = 3;
γik = γ, i, k = 1, 2; α1 = α2 = 1; P1 = P2 = P ;
SNR= P/σ2w=10 dB, ǫ=10−5.
The trade-offs between the error and the security constraints
γ are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 for nt = 5 and nt = 3,
respectively. Here PAN-C denotes the proposed design for
Problem P1 (precoding + artificial noise) found by using the
cooperative optimization approach in Section IV. P-C denotes
the proposed design when there is no artificial noise broadcast,
i.e., tr[Kvi ] = 0. Similarly, PAN-NC (precoding + artificial
noise) and P-NC (precoding only) denote the designs for
the scenario when the transmitters do not corporate while
designing the strategies.
In all scenarios PAN-C shows the best performance as
expected. In general, there is a substantial gap between the
performance of cooperative and non-cooperative schemes.
This gap gets smaller as secrecy constraints become more
demanding. Comparing PAN-C and P-C, we observe that for
low values of γ, these designs show similar performance
illustrating that linear precoding is sufficient to satisfy security
demands. On the other hand for relatively high values of γ, a
prominent performance difference is observed.
We observe that PAN-NC performs worse than or the same
as P-NC. Hence when there is no cooperation, additional noise
transmission may degrade the performance on average. When
there is no cooperation, each transmitter assumes that the
channel will be used only by itself. As a result, it is inclined
to use artificial noise with relatively high power in order to
satisfy the security constraints. When these designs are used
in the interference setting, they may degrade the performance
substantially as seen in Fig. 3; where the number of transmit
antennas is relatively small, hence transmitters are more likely
to adopt noise aided scheme to satisfy the security constraints.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered the problem of joint design of linear
precoder and artificial noise in Gaussian interference channels
with secrecy constraints. We have illustrated that broadcasting
artificial noise provides significant improvements especially
when the secrecy levels required at the eavesdroppers are
demanding. Our results also show that artificial noise aided
scheme can introduce substantial performance degradation
when the transmitters cannot cooperate. This suggests that
artificial noise should be used with caution in multiuser
environments if joint design is not possible.
We have focused on scenarios where eavesdroppers are
registered users of the network and full CSI is available at the
transmitters. Extensions to partial CSI scenarios are considered
as an important future research direction.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THM. 4.1
Let Si =
[
I A
†
i
Ai Zi
]
, i = 1, 2. Using Schur complement
[23, A.5.5], the positive semi-definite ordering constraints
in (12) can be written as positive semi-definiteness condi-
tions as Si  0, i = 1, 2. Let S¯ = (S1,S2). Now the
formulation in (13) can be equivalently written in terms of
(S¯, K¯v) instead of (Z¯, A¯, K¯v) (with the additional constraints
[Si]kl = [I]kl, k, l = 1, . . . , n). Let us refer to this equivalent
formulation as Problem 2-S. Since the formulation in (13)
is assumed to be solvable, Problem 2-S is also solvable and
there exist optimum values (S∗
1
,S∗
2
,K∗v1 ,K
∗
v2
). Considering
Problem 2-S with Si’s as optimization variables under these
fixed optimum values of (K∗v1 ,K
∗
v2
) and invoking [19, Thm
2.1] reveals that for n ≥ 3, there exist optimum solutions with
rank(Si) ≤ n. Hence Problem 2-S, or equivalently (13), has
the same optimum values with (10). Optimal Si’s for Problem
2-S with rank n can be constructed from an optimal solution
S∗i with arbitrary rank using [19, Algorithm RED]. Optimal
Ai’s for (10) can be found by taking the lower left nt × n
matrix of these rank-constrained Si’s [19, Lemma 2.1]. ✷
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